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Abstract:  This is an incomplete draft of a paper that will examine the competitive
tension that arises when banks which compete for deposits provide “interconnecting”
payment services to each other’s depositors.  This draft presents a basic theoretical model
and discusses some of the analysis that can be carried out and issues that can be
addressed with the model.
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Economic Studies at the Bank of Japan.  The views expressed herein are the author’s and do not represent
the views of the Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, the Federal Reserve System, or the Bank of Japan.2
Economists studying the theory of banking have typically focused mostly on the
role of institutions in intermediating between savers and uses or users of savers’ funds.
Recently, however, some economists have begun to turn their attention to the payment
function of banks.
2  The nature of this function and the way in which depository
institutions can play this role may depend on various features of a fully articulated
economic model.  Specifically, limits to information, communication and commitment
are likely to be important in determining the set of feasible payment arrangements.  At its
heart, however, the payment function of banks has a very simple fact; carrying cash is
costly.  In a commodity money economy in which exchange occurs at diverse locations
and times, there may be real resource costs associated with always having enough cash
on hand to meet one’s needs.  Similarly, in a fiat money regime with positive nominal
interest rates, carrying money imposes on agents the opportunity cost of forgone interest
income.  Hence, any institution that allows agents to store their wealth (preferably in a
form that earns a positive return) is potentially beneficial.
Storage at a fixed location raises the question of how to make payment for
consumption that occurs at a location remote from one’s storage.  One possibility is for
the consumer to receive credit, with payment to be sent at a later date.  Since technologies
for the transport of goods or money are likely to involve common costs, a credit
arrangement has the advantage of possibly economizing on the resource costs of sending
payment by pooling the shipments of several agents who maintain storage at one location
but consume at another.
For some purchases, however, direct credit between the buyer and the seller may
not be feasible.  The seller’s consumption needs may be such that he must be paid in cash
at the time of the purchase.  A consumer with money stored at a different location will
not be able to make such a purchase unless he is able to gain access to the medium of
exchange that is stored at the location where he wants to consume.  That is, he must enter
into some sort of credit arrangement with the storage facility at this location, to be settled
later with a shipment from his own deposits.  In this case, the provision of payment
services requires the coordinated inputs of two storage providers.
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When payment requires the input of more than one depository, there is a potential
tension between cooperation and competition.  On the one hand, by cooperating in
making remote payments, storage providers can offer a superior service, for which
consumers will be willing to pay more.  On the other hand, if customers choose among
competing depositories at distinct locations, the terms under which a depository provides
payment services to other providers’ depositors can be a powerful competitive tool.  If an
agent thinks that it is likely that he will want to consume at a particular location, and if
the depository at that location places a high price on payment services to non-depositors,
then the agent will have a strong incentive to place deposits at that location.
This tension between competition and cooperation is analogous to the interaction
among providers in competing network communication services.  In such industries, a
key issue concerns the terms under which one network’s customers can connect to those
of another network.  This interconnection problem has recently been examined in a series
of papers by Laffont Rey and Tirole and Economides, Lupomo and Woroch.  These
papers employ a model of imperfect competition between competing networks in which
sellers set prices of within- and across-network services.  The strategic use of across-
network prices (interconnection prices) introduces distortions that are distinct from the
usual market power distortion, and the authors explore the effectiveness of regulatory
pricing rules in counteracting these distortions.  McAndrews and McAndrews and
Roberds have reinterpreted this model in terms of the pricing of interbank payment
services.
One prominent feature of the model used in the recent communications literature
is the high degree of symmetry in the demand for the underlying services.  This
symmetry adds greatly to the model’s tractability but limits its usefulness somewhat,
especially, perhaps, in applications to banking and payments.  While the symmetric case
might apply reasonably well to the relationship among the banks in a large urban market,
the historical instances in which interconnection has become particularly contentious
seem to predominantly occur in cases where asymmetry was an important consideration.
In the U.S., there are many instances in which the interests of city banks and country
banks have diverged on matters of payment clearing and settlement.  In Japan, when there
was a general effort at forming a nationwide interbank clearing system in the 1940’s, the4
interest in such a system was strongest among the regional banks.  The so-called city
banks, with extensive internal branch networks, were less interested in such cooperation.
3
One purpose of this paper, then, is to introduce asymmetry in a tractable way.  At
the same time, the model presented below develops the interconnection problem within
the context of an explicit model of a market for storage and payment services.  This
results in a framework that can be extended and varied to examine a wide variety of
theoretical and policy issues concerning the banking and payment system.
1.  The Model
The economy lasts for three periods (t = 01 2 , , ) and consists of two types of
agents.  There is a continuum of consumers indexed by z ˛[ , ] 01 with a constant density.
These consumers derive utility from the consumption of two goods, a generic
consumption good and a location-specific good.  Each agent receives an endowment w of
the generic good at time zero.  This endowment may be stored, as described below, and is
consumed in period 2, the final period.  In the interim period, period 1, each agent wishes
to consume a location-specific good at one of two locations, location 0 and location 1.
An agent’s preference for location is the result of a shock realized at the start of period 1.
An agent’s lifetime expected utility is given by:
)], ( )) ( ( )[ 1 ( )] ( )) ( ( [ ) ( 1 1 0 0 z y z x u z y z x u z U + - + + = f f
where f  is the probability that the agent wants to consume the location 0 good, x z i( ) is
the consumption of an agent from z of the location i good, and y z i( ) is the final period
consumption of the generic good of a consumer from z who consumed at iin the interim
period.  The utility function u has standard characteristics.  In addition u(0) = 0.
An agent can consume the location-specific good only if he has stored his
endowment with a bank, as described below.  An agent may choose to hold his
endowment himself.  If he does, however, it is prohibitively costly to use his stored goods
to purchase location-specific consumption.  Hence, if an agent chooses self-storage, his
lifetime utility is u w h ( ) , 0 + -  where h is the cost of self-storage.
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At each of the two endpoint locations, 0 and 1, there is a single agent with a
superior technology for storing the generic good until the final period.  These agents, who
will be called banks, derive utility only from their consumption of the generic good in the
final period.
There are costs associated with transporting the generic good to storage.  If a
consumer at zchooses to place some endowment in storage with the bank at 0 (1), that
consumer incurs a cost of tz (t( ) 1- z ).  The generic good can also be transported
between storage locations in period 2.  One can make various assumptions about who has
the ability to use this final period transportation technology.  As an initial case, assume
that only the banks can make such shipments.
4  Alternatively, one might imagine that
there are differences in the enforceability of intertemporal payment commitments made
by banks and those made by individuals.  Specifically, enforcement actions against
individuals are impossible while those against banks are costless.
Production of the location-specific good requires input of the stored generic good.
One unit of generic good produces one unit of specific good.  One can imagine that this
production is undertaken by a distinct set of agents who are alive only during the interim
period, who derive utility from their consumption, y, of the generic good and disutility
from their production, x, of the specific good. These agents, then, will need to be paid out
of consumers’ deposits.  If there are a large number of such producers at each location,
then competition will limit producers’ profits to zero and the price of the location specific
good (in units of the generic good) will be one.  The need for settling transactions across
locations in the final period, then, arises from the need to pay for all location j specific
consumption out of generic goods stored at location j.  Some of this consumption will go
to consumers who did not place goods in storage at that location.
When an agent consumes at a location where he has no deposits, then payment to
producers must come out of the storage that is held at that location.  The bank at that
location will provide this funding if it expects compensation in the form of a final period
shipment of generic goods.  There may be costs associated with making such
interlocation payments.  As shipments for final settlements may be pooled, one might6
expect the associated costs to be largely fixed relative to the quantity shipped (up to the
capacity of a shipment).  The costs to the bank that provides interim funding for
interlocation consumption may involve, for instance, the costs of communicating
payment information to consumers’ home bank.
5  Like transportation costs, these costs
might also be largely fixed relative to the quantity of interlocation consumption.  For the
moment, assume that the only variable cost associated with interlocation payments is a
cost of c (in units of the generic good, per unit of specific consumption) incurred by the
bank providing interim funding.
Banks will seek compensation for their storage and payment services so as to
maximize their profits (their final period consumption of the generic good).  One can
imagine a wide array of pricing terms for bank’s services, and this will be the topic of
section 3.  All pricing terms are announced before consumers make their deposit
decisions.  The timing of events in the economy are summarized below.
Period 1: Agents receive their endowments.
Banks announce prices.
Agents make deposit decisions.
Period 2: Preference shocks are realized.
Agents travel to desired locations.
Producers are paid with locally stored generic goods.
Location-specific consumption occurs.
Producers consume their payments and disappear.
Period 3: Banks compensate each other for interlocation consumption.
Banks deduct expenses and prices from agents’ deposits.
Banks consume their profits.
Agents consume their remaining deposits.
2.  Efficient Allocations
                                                                                                                                                                    
4 This assumption amounts to making the bundling of storage and payment services in the same institutions
exogenous.  Hence, one might not wish to think of this model as providing a deep theory of why banks
provide payment services.
5 In the model presented here, such information does not really need to be communicated, since it is known
how much will be consumed at any given location n (though it is not known ex ante who will consume
where).  In a model extended to include additional sources of uncertainty, such communication could be
important7
An allocation in this economy describes the deposit (storage) and consumption
behavior of the consumers and the profits (consumption) of the banks.  A storage
allocation is represented by a pair of functions, s z s z 0 1 ( ), ( ), giving the amount stored at
locations 0 and 1, respectively, by an agent from location z.  The amounts deposited in
storage are limited by the following constraints:
s z w z 0( ) , £ -t
s z w z 1 1 ( ) ( ), £ - - t  and
s z s z w 0 1 ( ) ( ) , + £ -t  if min[ ( ), ( )] s z s z 0 1 0 > .
An agent’s consumption allocation is represented by the functions x z y z i i ( ), ( ),
for i = 01 , , as introduced above.  If  r z i( ) denotes payments by an agent from z to the
bank at i, then agents’ consumption faces the following constraint:
 6
y z s z s z x z r z r z i i ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ). £ + - - - 0 1 0 1
A bank’s utility is simply its consumption of the generic good, which is equal to
the payments it receives from agents less the costs it incurs in providing payment
services.  As specified above, the only such cost is a cost of c per unit of specific
consumption at ithat is not covered by deposits at i.  Hence, a bank’s profits can be
written as
Pi i ri z xi z si z c dz = - - ￿ { ( ) [ ( ) ( )] } .
The welfare criterion by which efficiency will be judged is the sum of consumers’
expected utility and banks’ profits.  Given the linearity of all agents’ utility in the generic
consumption good, payments from consumers to banks in excess of the costs of
interlocation consumption are pure transfers and neither add to nor subtract from welfare.
That is, welfare is aggregate expected utility from specific consumption plus aggregate
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generic good for each unit of  specific good produced.  Therefore, their profits and utility are zero, and they
are ignored in the specification of feasible and efficient allocations.8
generic consumption, where the latter is the endowment net of:  the costs of making
deposits;  consumption of the specific good; and costs of interlocation payment.
Given the fixed nature of deposit costs, relative to the amount deposited, small
positive values of s z i( )  are likely to be dominated by either larger values or values of
zero.  One can make this statement with certainty for large enough values of the
endowment, w.
Let x
* be the level of specific consumption that solves the problem, max[ ( ) ] u x x - .
Then, if w x - ‡ t 2
*, efficient storage will always involve one of the following:
s z s z 0 1 0 ( ) ( ) ; = =
s z s z w z 0 1 0 1 ( ) , ( ) ( ); = = - - t
s z s z w z 1 0 0 ( ) , ( ) ; = = -t  or
s z s z x 0 1 2 ( ), ( ) .
* ‡
The amount x
* is the greatest amount of the specific good an agent will ever
consume.  It is, in fact, the amount an agent will consume in an efficient allocation if
there is enough storage at the location where he is consuming: the marginal cost (in
foregone generic consumption) of a unit of specific consumption, when no interlocation
flow of payment is required, is just one.  When interlocation payment is necessary, the
marginal cost of specific consumption rises to 1+c.  Define x
c as the level of specific
consumption solving max[ ( ) ( ) ]. u x c x - + 1   This will be the efficient specific
consumption of an agent who has storage at one location but consumes at the other.
Given the characterization of efficient specific consumption, efficient storage can
be characterized by a set of threshold levels of z.  As described, above, there are only
really four discrete choices for a given agent’s storage:  all at location 0; all at location 1;
some at both locations; or no storage (self-storage).  Note first that the last two of these
options are independent of an agent’s home location in terms of the lifetime utility they
generate.  Diversified deposits (some at each location) will be superior to self storage (no
deposits with banks) if u x u h ( ) ( ) .
* - ‡ - t 0   Of the other two options, the value
generated by placing all deposits at location 0 is decreasing in z, while the value of9
placing all at location 1 is increasing in z.  Define z z 0 1 , ,and z01 by the following three
equalities:
f f f t t u x u x c x z u x u h
c c ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) max[ ( ) ; ( ) ];
* * + - - - - = - - 1 1 0 0
f f f t t u x u x c x z u x u h
c c ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) max[ ( ) ; ( ) ];
* * + - - - - = - - 1 1 0 1
f f f t f f f t u x u x c x z u x u x c x z
c c c c ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) . ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ).
* * + - - - - = + - - - - 1 1 1 1 01 01
Efficient deposit patterns, then, will depend on the cost parameters t,h and c, as
well as on the parameters of the utility function u and the preference shock probability f .
This paper will focus on two types of deposit patterns.  A two-segment deposit pattern is
one in which the relevant threshold is z01, where all consumers with z z £ 01 deposit only
at 0, and all with z z ‡ 01 deposit at 1.
7  A three-segment pattern is one with thresholds
z0, and z z 1 0 > ; all agents with z z £ 0  deposit only at 0, while those with z z ‡ 1 deposit
only at 1.  Agents in the middle segment, ( , ) z z 0 1  either diversify or self-store.  Note that
as t gets large the value of both specialized and diversified deposits decreases.  Hence,
the focus here will be on three-segment outcomes in which the middle segment receives
no banking services.  If the thresholds defined above are such that z z z 0 01 1 < < , then a
tree-segment pattern is efficient, while a two segment pattern is efficient if  this ordering
of thresholds is reversed.
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3.  Pricing of Services
The banks in this environment can extract earnings from the deposits placed with
them by agents.  As local monopolists, they can earn positive profits.  They compete,
however, in trying to attract deposits away from each other (and away from the self-
storage option).  One can imagine a wide range of pricing structures that might be
employed.  Any such structure amounts to a particular pricing game played by the banks.
Generally, one would assume that they would try to devise pricing schemes that
allow them to extract the maximum profit.  Typically, such schemes would involve as
much price discrimination as is feasible.  For the bank at location i, one can represent
perfect price discrimination by a set of functions xi
j z yi
j z ( ), ( ), for i j , , , = 01  giving the
second period specific consumption (x) and the third period generic consumption (y) of a
consumer with deposits at iwho consumes at  j.  These are functions of z, because an
agent’s original location will determine how much he can deposit at the bank.  These
consumption schedules are equivalent to nonlinear pricing schedules.  In addition to
setting these consumption schedules, banks might set prices that they charge each other
for the provision of interlocation services.  Specifically, bank icharges bank  j a price qi
(in units of the generic good delivered in the final period) for each unit of location  j
good consumed by depositors from i.  The game in which banks’ strategy spaces consist
of the space of functions xi
j z yi
j z ( ), ( )and the space of prices qi will be referred to as the
perfect price discrimination game.
Perfect price discrimination may not be feasible.  For instance, a bank may not be
able to discriminate among depositors on the basis of their home locations.
8  In such a
case, banks may be limited to simpler pricing structures.   One possible pricing structure
involves prices only on transaction services, but different prices for intra- and
interlocation payments.  That is, each bank imight set three prices,  p q i ai , , and qbi .
Here,  pi  is the price charged by bank ito its own depositors for each unit of specific
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deposits.  If the model were extended to allow heterogeneous endowments at given locations, then the
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consumption at i.  One could also think of this as the price for withdrawals prior to the
final period.  The other two prices represent the price of the two components of
interlocation payment services.  The first, qai, is the price that bank icharges its own
depositors for each unit of specific good they consume at the other location, while qbi  is
the price charged by bank ito depositors of the other location for each unit of specific
good they consume at i.  This last price can be viewed equivalently as a price charged by
bank ito the other bank for allowing access to local payments.  In this case, the price qai,
should be viewed as the mark-up bank isets over its own costs when its depositors
consume abroad.  When depositors from 0 consume at 1, for instance, bank 1 charges
bank 0 qb1 per unit consumed, so that bank 0’s marginal cost is qb1.
This structure with three linear prices for three different types of transaction
services is analogous to the pricing structures examined in the literature on
telecommunication network competition.  In that literature, the three prices are a price for
within network calls, and prices for initiating and terminating inter-network calls.  Papers
by Laffont, Rey and Tirole and Economides, Lupomo and Woroch examine the effects of
certain regulatory interventions when providers play this three-price game.  One such rule
is a reciprocity rule which requires some or all of the cross-network prices to be equated
across providers.  One might require, for instance, that q q b b 0 1 = .  In the cited literature,
such a rule can result in a more efficient allocation by eliminating two sources of
distortion.  First, when providers set interlocation prices non-cooperatively, there is a
classic “double marginalization” problem that arises when two firms with market power
sell complementary goods; the services of both providers are necessary to complete an
interlocation payment (or an internetwork call).  Second, unrestrained competition gives
sellers an incentive to compete for depositors (network membership) by raising the inter-
network access price.
With the present model, one could perform an analogous exercise, including an
examination of how results change as the model departs from symmetry.  This model is
fully symmetric when f =
1
2
.   In this case, for instance, a reciprocity rule has the same
effects as in the telecommunications literature.  For f „ 0, one can derive a generalized
rule that would have the same beneficial effects.  This generalized rule, however,12
becomes a complicated function of the model’s parameters, and it is unlikely that an
external regulator would have the information necessary to determine the correct rule.
Many of the insights that come from the three-price game outlined above can also
be obtained from a game with an even simpler pricing structure.  Notice first, that the
three-price game involves prices on payment services but none on deposit services.  In
the context of the present model, this structure might seem odd or unreasonable.
Consumers face an essentially discrete choice between depositing with bank 0 or bank 1.
It seems natural to attach a price to that choice.
9  Also, the pricing of deposit services has
historically been an important source of bank revenue, arguably more important than the
direct pricing of payment services.  While this fact is at least in part due to a tradition of
legal restrictions on the payment of interest on deposits (which puts a lower bound on the
price of deposit services), the technology for the joint provision of deposit and payment
services may be important also, as it does in this model.
The simpler pricing structure to be considered, then, consists of two prices for
each bank.  First, each bank sets a price  pi  for deposit services.  This is a fixed price
relative to the location and quantity of specific consumption.  Each bank ialso sets a
price qi which it charges for the other bank’s depositors’ consumption at location i.
This price, in units of generic good per unit of specific good can be thought of either as
being charged to the other bank or directly to the other bank’s depositors.
10
Given prices ( , ) p q 0 0 and ( , ) p q 1 1 , one can determine the expected utility
generated for a consumer at z from the various deposit options.  First, define the functions
x q ( )and v q ( )as follows:
x q u x p x
v q u x q q x q
( ) argmax[ ( ) ( ) ],





The expected value of placing storage only at bank 0, then, is
                                                       
9 Indeed, one might make the same observation about the telecommunications models, where consumers
face a discrete choice of which network to join.
10 It can be shown that if this price is charged, as an input price, to the other bank, and if the other bank is
allowed to set a mark-up, the mark-up will optimally  be chosen to be zero.13
V v v q w z p 0 1 0 0 1 = + - + - - f f t ( ) ( ) ( ) .
Similarly, the values of placing storage at bank 1 and at both banks are, respectively
V v q v w z p 1 0 1 1 0 1 = + - + - - - f f t ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ,
and
V v w p p 01 0 1 0 = + - - - ( ) . t
Suppose that in the relevant ranges of prices  p0 and  p1, V01 is less than the value
of self-storage, u w h Vh ( ) 0 + - ” .  Then, the potential thresholds for determining deposit
behavior are the points of indifference between pairs of options. The consumer who is
indifferent between depositing only at zero and not depositing at either bank is described
by z0 .  That is, z0 is the z for which V0 =Vh.  Similarly, at z1, V1 =Vh, while z01 is the
point of indifference between depositing only at 0 and depositing only at 1; at z01,
V V 0 1 = .  Normalizing u( ) 0  to 0, then, these thresholds are
z v v q h p
z v q v h p
z D q D q p p
0 1 0
1 0 1











= + - + -
= - + - + -







{ ( ) ( ) ( ) }
{ ( ) ( ) ( ) }
{ ( , ) ( ) ( , ) },
where D q q v q v q ( , ) ( ) ( ). ¢ ” - ¢
Hence the market divides either into two segments, with all consumers z z < 01
depositing at 0 and those above at 1, or into three segments with all consumers between
z0 andz1 being priced out of the market for bank services.  The latter, three-segment
market division will occur if V V 0 1 >  at z0.  This condition is equivalent to z z 0 1 < , which
will be true if, at prices ( , , , ) p q p q 0 0 1 1 ,14
t f f > + + - + - - v v q v q h p p ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) . 0 1 2 0 1 0 1
Hence, the three-segment outcome will tend to result, for given prices, when costs
of depositing at banks are high relative to the cost of self-storage.  Strategic interaction
between the banks is quite different in the two- and three-segment cases.  Consider first,
the three-segment case.  That is, consider a case in which parameters are such that
equilibrium prices generate a three-segment market structure.  To be precise, one should
first define a price equilibrium.  It is somewhat more convenient, however, to define and
characterize a three-segment equilibrium (in solving for such an equilibrium, one would
have to check that the above condition for the three-segment case is satisfied).
When there are three segments, divided at z0 and z1, the banks’ profits can be
written as:
P0 0 0 1 0 0 1 = + - - z p z x q q c ( ) ( )( ) f
P1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 = - + - - ( ) ( ) ( )( ). z p z x q q c f
With these profit functions, a Nash equilibrium is a set of prices ( , , , ) p q p q 0 0 1 1  such that
for each i, ( , ) p q i i  maximizes Pi  given the other bank’s prices ( , ) p q j j .
This pricing game results in a standard “double marginalization” problem.  With
three segments in the market, the marginal consumer is not choosing between depositing
at 0 and depositing at 1.  Rather, marginal consumers are choosing between depositing
with one of the banks and not depositing at all.  Hence, there is no direct competition
between the banks.  By rewriting the profit functions with the thresholds z0 and z1
expressed as functions of prices, one can see that that bank 0’s choice of  p0 has no effect
on its own profits from the sale of payment services to bank 1’s depositors and no effect
on bank 1’s profits from the sale of deposit services.  The choice of  p0 does, however,
affect bank 1’s sale of payment services to bank 0’s customers, since an increase in  p0
reduces the number of depositors at 0.  Similarly, bank 0’s choice of q0, its payment
service price to bank 1’s depositors, affects bank 1’s profits from deposit services; an15
increase in q0 increases the cost of depositing at 1, reducing the number of depositors at
1 but having no effect on depositors at 0.
The first order conditions for  p0 and q0 can be written as (similar conditions hold
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q c
q
x q q c
( ) ( ) ( )
[ ( ) ( ) ( ) ][
( )









+ - + - =




where e is the price elasticity of the demand function x.
11
These conditions, together with the analogous conditions for bank 1’s prices,
imply positive mark-ups in the equilibrium prices of payment services ( ) q c i >  .  Unlike
the usual case of a noncooperative pricing game among competing sellers of substitute
goods, reducing a bank’s payment services price q increases the rival’s profits by
increasing the rival’s deposits.  Indeed, calculating the prices that maximize the sum of
the bank’s profits would reveal that the optimal mark-up on payment services is zero
( ) q c i = .  Since such pricing eliminates a wedge between marginal cost and price, it has
the potential of raising consumer welfare as well as profits, even though the collusive
prices on deposit services ( ) pi are greater than the corresponding noncooperative prices.
This is, in fact, true for the three-segment case.  To summarize:
Collusive choice of prices ( , , , ) p q p q 0 0 1 1  results in higher bank profits and 
consumer welfare than does noncooperative pricing.  Collusive deposit prices
( pi )  are greater than noncooperative prices, and collusive payment services prices (qi)
are equal to marginal cost.
Of  course collusive price agreements among sellers of related products may not
be enforceable, especially in an environment where antitrust laws prohibit contracts in
restraint of trade and where enforcement of such laws is imperfect.  Finding it difficult or
costly to determine which price fixing contracts are welfare enhancing and which are not,
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the courts or administrative officials might reasonably opt to prohibit all such
agreements.
In the telecommunications literature, some have suggested a regulatory rule
imposing reciprocity in interconnection prices  between networks as a way of dealing
with the type of coordination problem outlined above.  In the present model, a reciprocity
rule would mean that one bank chooses a payment services price that must be used by
both, while the banks continue to set their deposit prices noncooperatively.  One can
show that, in the three-segment case, a reciprocity rule results in exactly the collusive
outcome if and only if the market is symmetric (f =
1
2
).  Even when it does not
implement the fully collusive prices, such a rule may still generally improve welfare,
although this may depend on which bank chooses the “interconnection” price.  The
smaller bank (bank 0 if f <
1
2
) will have a tendency to put more weight on its profits
from payment services and less on its profits from.
Matters are somewhat more complicated in the two-segment case.  Here, the
banks engage in direct competition for depositors.  The payment services price becomes
not just a source of revenues in its own right but also a tool by which a bank can increase
the attractiveness of its own deposit services.  By raising qi , a bank makes it more costly
for consumers to deposit their endowments with the other bank.  Hence, in the two
segment case firms have an even greater incentive to raise the mark-up of payment prices
over marginal cost.
Some further Issues
One important point is that the role of the interlocation payment services price
depends on the type of competition in which the banks engage.  For instance, suppose
banks play the “perfect price discrimination game” introduced above.  This is a very17
aggressive form of competition, which amounts to dividing the market into a continuum
of segments (one for each z) and engaging in direct (Bertrand) competition for each
segment.  Here allowing cooperation in interlocation payment pricing while maintaining
competition in the pricing of deposit services can have a very different effect from above.
Since an increase in q would reduce the cost of losing the competition for the deposits
from a particular z, the intensity of such competition will tend to decline as q rises.  That
is, coordination on interconnection pricing can be a means to facilitate collusion among
competing banks.
The model described above simply assumes the existence of only one bank at
each location.  One can (with certain limitations) examine the effects of introducing intra-
location competition.  One thing that is clear is that, with the technology assumed above,
if there is a large number of banks (or potential banks) at each location (with identical
technologies), then a competitive equilibrium will result in an efficient allocation.  This
issue, of course becomes more complicated if there are non-convexities in the technology
for producing deposit and payment services.  Since historical periods of deregulation of
banking have often been associated with the elimination of certain protections from
competition afforded to some banks, it should be useful to examine the effects of
increasing competition with this type of model.  This comment applies to both intra- and
inter-location competition.
Introducing intra-location competition also allows one to consider a case that has
some historical relevance in the U.S..  Much of the discussion about the check-clearing
system before the founding of the Fed has centered on the behavior of small banks that
were monopolists in small communities.  One could model such a market structure by
assuming that f  is small and assuming that there is one bank at location 0 and many at
location 1.
There are many possible extensions and variations of the model presented above.
One worth noting involves the use of cash.  Above, it was assumed that location-specific
goods could only be purchased with claims on bank deposits.  One could assume instead
that agents could carry the generic good with them, at some cost.  How would
competition among banks affect the use of  “cash,” and how would changes in the cost of18
using cash affect the competition among banks?  A simple extension of the present model
could address such questions.19
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